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Abstract
Serious allegations of fraud have been made with respect to Russia's first competitive 
party-based parliamentary election in December 1993 - the same election in which Rus­
sian's ostensibly ratified a new constitution for themselves. Although charges of fraud are 
common in elections, these allegations are especially serious in that the argument here 
was that over 9 million ballots were fraudulently cast and that the turnout threshold
of 50% required to render the constitutional referendum legitimate was in fact not sur­
passed. These are profoundly important allegations. First, they bring into question the 
legitimacy of Russia's new constitution and thereby offer its opponents an excuse to sus­
pend its provisions some time in the future. Second, they naturally enough cause us to be 
suspicious of Russia's December 1995 parliamentary elections. Finally, to the extent that
the same methods for detecting fraud are likely to be applied to subsequent elections, if 
they revel significant levels of fraud there, they can provide an excuse for canceling those 
elections or invalidating their results. In this essay, then, we look at the two method­
ologies employed to detect and measure the extent of fraud in 1993. Without disputing
the possibility that fraud was in fact extensive, we conclude that neither methodology 
as presently developed is adequate to the task at hand. The first, which assumes that 
we should observe a linear relationship between the log of the rank of parties and the 
log of their support at the polls employs a number of ad hoc assumptions and a priori 
estimates that, in sum, are equivalent to assuming the conclusion. The second method, 
which looks at the relationship between turnout and the share of the electorate voting for 
one party or position versus another, is subject to a number of methodological pitfalls, 
including aggregation error and the possibility that unobserved variables correlate with 
both turnout and support so as to render any relationship indeterminate. Nevertheless,
of the two methodologies, the second is the most promising for further development and 
our critique of it is intended to point the way to the requisite developments. 
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The results of Russia's first competitive party-based elections and constitutional referendum 
of December 12, 1993 have been the subject of considerable controversy . According to one 
observer, Russian physicist Alexander Sobyanin, who served at the time as one of Yeltsin's 
political analysts and the representative for Russia's Choice on the Central Election Commission, 
no fewer than 9 million ballots were falsified to favor communists, nationalists, regional leaders, 
and Yeltsin's constitution. Unsurprisingly, the "formal " report of such allegations in March 1994 
(Sobyanin and Suchovolsky 1994) received worldwide notice . Isvestia called it "political 
dynamite" and the U.S.  media prominently reported the claim that more than 15 percent of the 
ballots were falsified and that turnout had not exceeded the 50% threshold required to render 
Russia's constitutional referendum legitimate . Despite their notoriety, these allegations have been 
largely ignored by political analysts, vis-a-vis the absence of any independent attempt to verify 
or disconfirm them. This is unfortunate not only because such allegations cast a cloud on the 
legitimacy of Russia's infant constitutional structures and because, as we see in the aftermath of 
the latest (December 1995) Russian parliamentary elections, they encourage losers to attribute 
their electoral failures to trickery and fraud (Maximov 1995), but also because it is useful in 
general to develop methods for detecting fraud when an election's administration cannot be 
observed directly (Carey 1995). Russia is not the only country in which the remoteness of polls 
and the authority of regional politicians make it difficult for neutral observers to monitor 
elections. But unlike the commonplace cries of 'foul' commonly uttered by losing politicians 
everywhere, Sobyanin and his colleagues propose several methods for detecting fraud using 
aggregate election data, and it is thereby important that those methods be given closer scrutiny 
than they have heretofore received. 
Insofar as the specifics of the Russian case are concerned, the general acceptance of 
allegations of fraud is unsurprising. First and most suspiciously, official elections returns have 
never been published except at a level of aggregation (regions and Duma election districts) that 
precludes reanalysis. Second, given the brief period between Yeltsin's announcement of the 
election and the actual balloting (less than two months), neutral third-party observers had little 
time to organize effective oversight. Third, the Central Election Commission, authorized to 
oversee and police virtually every aspect of Russia's infant electoral system, largely prohibited 
party observers from any meaningful oversight of ballot counting and tabulation. Fourth ,  although 
a modicum of democratic process had begun to characterize election procedures in Russia's urban 
centers, there is little reason to believe that such processes had yet invaded a Stalinist system 
designed to report turnout rates in excess of 99 .8% and virtually unanimous support for official 
candidates. 
These considerations, in combination with the stakes of the election -- control of both 
chambers of the national legislature and adoption of a new federal constitution -- would lead even 
cautious observers to look for the star in the east if it could be established that substantial fraud 
did not occur at some level. Claims of large-scale fraud also make sense in that  they point to a 
seemingly logical logroll that benefitted a wide cross-section of political interests. Rather than 
under-count the votes for specific candidates, the asserted fraud consisted largely of added ballots 
cast in ways the benefitted most of those who were positioned to contest the election's 
legitimacy : communists and nationalists , whose share of seats in the Duma were increased by the 
fraudulent ballots , regional bosses whose positions in the Federation Council were secured by 
those ballots , and Yeltsin and his coterie of reformers, who required the additional official turnout 
to legitimize voter approval of their strongly pro-presidential constitution. In addition, one need 
not presume the existence of any well-organized conspiracy. Regional or sub-regional-level 
officials , anxious to satisfy their bosses, would have a clear incentive to "facilitate" the election 
of those bosses to the Federation Council and to play a possibly unwitting hand in facilitating 
the implementation of the logroll. 
The failure to reassess Sobyanin's analysis , though, was precluded by more than the 
unavailability of data or by an unwillingness to assume that Russian elections could be free of 
significant fraud. His original report, including its methodology, has been published in a form 
that only hints at technical details. Although most Russian papers reported its conclusions, none 
explained the methodology, and Western readers could find only a brief description of it in an 
article translated and published in 1994 (Gelman, Sobyanin, and Kaiunov 1994). Fortunately, 
more recent publications (Sobyanin 1995, Sobyanin and Suchovolsky 1995, Myagkov and 
Sobyanin 1995) have filled in some technical gaps, provided the data employed in the original 
analysis, and augmented the original method for detecting fraud with a second method. Thus, our 
goal is to reexamine both methodologies. 
Our reassessment leads largely to a series of negative conclusions. Although we cannot 
preclude the possibility of fraud as alleged, we cannot validate the conclusion that nine million 
or more ballots were added to the count. Even if fraud took precisely the form suggested, the 
methodologies employed are ill-equipped for detecting it, for measuring its magnitude, or, given 
the quality of the data available, for distinguishing between the null hypothesis that  there was 
fraud (the assumption of Sobyanin and his associates) and the hypothesis that there was no fraud 
(the usual hypothesis when using any methodology for validating such things). In offering these 
conclusions, this essay is organized as follows : Section 1 reviews some of the reasons why 
suspicions of fraud first arose in the December elections and Section 2 turns to the original 
method of analysis employed by Yeltsin's analytical research team. Our conclusion here is that 
the 'anomalies' in the data taken as evidence of fraud may be little more than the logical 
consequences of a political competition and a country's electoral laws. Moreover, the application 
of this method requires a priori knowledge of fraud, of who benefitted from fraud, and of the 
approximate magnitude of that fraud. Section 3 focuses on the constitutional referendum and 
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'anomalies ' in the data cited by the second method in the relationship between turnout and 
support for the constitution. Here we conclude that these anomalies are little more than the 
consequence of aggregating data across regions and that within-region patterns correspond closely 
to the patterns Sobyanin cites as 'normal . '  Section 4 offers the additional argument that even if 
aggregation error is not present, we cannot exclude the possibility that otherwise anomalous 
patterns in the constitutional referenda data are the consequence of the different strategies of 
opponents and supporters of the constitution. Section 5 looks at the party list voting for the Duma 
and argues that although we cannot explain the anomalies in the data here in precisely the same 
way as we do for the constitutional referenda, we can nevertheless detect the consequences of 
aggregating the data across urban and rural voting districts -- consequences that would yield an 
over-estimation of the magnitude of fraud. Finally, Section 6 argues that even if we can 
accommodate the issue of aggregation, some notes of caution about inferring the magnitude of 
fraud from the proposed methodology are still warranted, and Section 7 offers some concluding 
remarks . 
1. First Suspicions 
Largely for the reasons we cite earlier, Sobyanin and his associates , long before the 
December 1993 balloting, anticipated that fraud would be pervasive . The allegation of widespread 
fraud, though, might not have received much attention had the election's outcome been different. 
At least among journalists and the population in general,  the suspicion that something was amiss 
arose as soon as it became evident that, with 22.8  percent of the party-list vote for the Duma, 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) , had outpolled democratic 
reformers, and Russia 's Choice in particular. Although many commentators concluded that 
Zhirinovsky ran a far more effective campaign than his opponents (Wyman, Miller , White and 
Heywood 1994 ; Lentini 1994 ; Hughes 1994), and that his relative success revealed a 
correspondence between radical electoral choices and deteriorating socio-economic circumstances, 
neutral observers and not a few of Russia 's reformers were skeptical of an election in which 
Russia 's Choice, with 15% of the party-list vote , barely exceeded the support garnered by the 
Communist Party and its fellow traveler , the Agrarians . Ultimately, Russia 's Choice emerged as 
the Duma's largest voting block, but only because of its success in the single member 
constituencies, where the name recognition of its candidates overcame the incoherent claims of 
thirteen competing parties in a hastily called election. How, democratic reformers asked, could 
the primary vessel of democratic reform fail except by fraud when it enjoyed such obvious 
advantages as direct access to the Kremlin, control of the mass media, an adequate supply of 
campaign funds, and the truth? 
People, though, should not have been surprised by the outcome. The surprise was occasioned 
largely by opinion surveys, published in October and November, which put Russia 's Choice in 
the lead with between one-third and two-fifths of the vote and which estimated Communist Party 
and LDPR support at between 3% and 10%.1 Most of these surveys, though,  were conducted 
exclusively in large.industrial cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, where Russia 's Choice 
See, for example, Sevodnya, October 30, 1993; Izvestia, November 9,  1993, and 
Argumenty I Facty, # 44 , November 1993. 
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obtained a plurality of party list votes (34.7% in Moscow, 27% in St.Petersburg), and even 
ostensibly representative polls would have difficulty monitoring the views of backwards rural 
areas since rural sub-samples tend to be settlement points near major cities (Wyman et al . 1 995, 
Shlapentokh 1 994, Rose 1995). Several polls did in fact record a significant increase in the 
popularity of the LDPR during the last weeks of the campaign. For example, the All-Russian 
Center for Public Opinion Research initially recorded support for the LDPR at 4 percent a month 
before elections, at 15 percent a week before the vote, and at 24 percent in a post-election survey. 
Similarly, pre-election and post-election polls conducted by researchers from the University of 
Glasgow noted that the LDPR's support more than doubled during the final weeks of the 
campaign (Wyman et al, 1 994, 1 995) and that at least 1 8  percent of voters voted for a party other 
than the one they said they would vote for a weak before election. This experience with late 
shifts in voter intentions, duplicated in other newly developing democracies, is easily explained 
by weak partisan attachments,  by the absence of meaningful party labels , and by the presence of 
numerous parties and politicians campaigning on essentially indistinguishable platforms. In 
retrospect, that Russia's Choice failed to meet its objectives or that Zhirinovsky out-polled his 
opponents cannot be taken as prima face evidence of fraud. It is evidence only that political 
analysts in Russia were unfamiliar with the potential volatility of electorates in emerging 
democracies . The reasons for believing that widespread fraud had occurred in 1 993 would have 
been no more or less compelling had initial expectations been met. 
2 .  First Analysis 
Although various stories can be told about how fraud was implemented (Orttung 1995, 
Sobyanin and Suchovolsky 1995), allegations of widespread fraud in 1 993 are based less on first 
hand observation and more on the discovery of various 'anomalies' in the election returns -- the 
'fingerprints' left by those who added ballots to the total or who otherwise manipulated summary 
election returns. Two sets of fingerprints and correspopnding methodologies for detecting them 
are offered as evidence, and both warrant close scrutiny since each, if legitimate, promises a way 
to assess the magnitude of fraud when first-hand observations are unavailable. 
First, though, it is useful to recount the basis for the original estimate of 9.3 million falsified 
(added) ballots . Briefly, having noted that support for the constitution was surprisingly constant 
across Russia -- approximately 3 1  to 32 percent of the eligible electorate -- Sobyanin et al also 
noted that the vote against the constitution varied greatly . Ignoring the arguments put forth for 
this particular classification, eleven regions were identified as "relatively honest," with the 
percentage supporting the constitution there, among those voting, is as follows: 
Moscow 68% 
St Petersburg 70% 
Sverdlovsk region 78% 
Chelyabinsk region 75% 
Perm region 77% 
Magadan region 67% 
Kamchatka region 68% 
Archangelsk region 7 1  % 
Murmansk region 69% 
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Karelia 69% 
Tomsk region 66% 
Assuming that the true percentage of voters who cast ballots for the constitution was 70% 
uniformly throughout Russia and that the actual number of votes cast 'against' was three sevenths 
of the number voting 'for' (33 million), it follows that the number voting 'against' was 3/7 times 
33 million or approximately 14 million. Adding 14 million to 33 million, plus the 2 million 
invalid ballots cast on the referendum yields an estimate of 49 million ballots. Subtracting this 
number from the official count of 58.2 million ballots yields the reported 9.2 million added 
ballots. 
Of course , such back-of-the-envelope calculations are hardly persuasive. Nor do they promise 
any universal method for detecting and measuring fraud. For these more general ends we need 
to turn to Sobyanin and Suchovolsky's ( 1994) adaptation of a 'universal law' relating the rank 
of objects according to some criterion to the value that criterion assumes for each object. Briefly, 
consider city population. Suppose we order cities from most to least populous, letting R(J) be city 
I's rank and P(J) its population. Then if we take a diverse enough sample, it is by now 
demographic folklore that the relation between R and P will correspond approximately to the 
equation (Rosen and Resnik 1980), 
R(J)P(J)b = A 
where b and A are constants. Notice now that if we take the log of both sides of this equation 
we get 
logR(J) + blogP(J) = log A ( 1) 
which is merely the equation for a straight line. That is , if we let y = logR(J) and x = logP(J), 
K = log(A)lb and B = lib , our data should be consistent with the following expression: 
x = K - By (2) 
Expression (2) captures people's attention because it appears to apply to a diverse range of 
phenomena, in addition to the population of cities , such as the populations of various species and 
the rank of industrial firms as measured by gross annual sales. As a consequence, numerous 
researchers have sought to justify this expression as a law-like generalization. And here, insofar 
as our research concerns the number of voters who vote for different political parties, the most 
relevant study is Simon ( 1955) and Ijiri and Simon's ( 1974) analysis of firm size. Together , these 
studies show theoretically that if the growth rate of firms is independent of size, if there is free 
entry of new firms at the bottom of the market, if smaller firms are no more likely to disappear 
through bankruptcy or merger than larger ones , and if the resources of firms that fail are 
distributed among surviving firms independently of size, then expression (2) will approximately 
describe the size distribution of firms in an economy. Thus, if we transpose Ijiri and Simon's 
model to political competition, expression (2) should describe the relationship between the rank 
of a party (or a candidate , depending on the structure of the election) and the strength of its 
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support -- provided that assumptions equivalent to Ijiri and Simon's hold, such as that larger 
parties have no advantage over smaller ones in their ability to attract new voters , that all parties 
have the same likelihood of merging with someone else or of disappearing altogether, and that 
wholly new parties can freely enter the competition. Deviations from expression (2), then, would 
arise if any one of these assumptions is invalid -if something other than a wholly stochastic 
process describes the mechanism whereby parties grow, merge, dissolve, emerge -- or are 
otherwise credited with votes . 
The argument Sobyanin and his colleagues offer is that expression (2) fails to describe 
Russia's electoral statistics because of the non-random element of fraud. In fact, the assertion that 
9.2 million ballots were fraudulently added to the total is based on the assumption that the most 
serious deviations from a linear relationship can be attributed to fraud. This assertion, though, 
occasions three questions : ( 1) If we accept the hypothesis of fraud, does expression (2) allow us 
to estimate its magnitude ; (2) were the deviations as pervasive as Sobyanin suggests ; and (3) are 
there other reasonable explanations for deviations from expression (2)? 
Turning to the first question, consider the following example with five candidates : 
Candidate 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
Votes 
155,00 
1 14,00 
43,000 
3 1,000 
24,000 
Percent 
42 .2 
3 1 . 1  
1 1 .7 
8 .5 
6 .5 
Figure I graphs the log of vote against the log of rank, and reveals that instead of a linear 
relationship, there is a 'kink' in favor of the second ranked candidate. If we take this kink as an 
indication of fraud favoring candidate B, and if we want to estimate its magnitude -- to calculate 
the number of additional ballots marked to favor B -- Sobyanin suggests drawing a straight line 
between A and E and calculating the difference between B's predicted total and B's reported 
vote. In this example, B is 'too large' by approximately 45,000 votes, and thus this is the number 
of ballots assumed to have been added to B's total. 
Ignoring the theoretical underpinnings of expression (2) for a moment, there are several 
practical problems that must be addressed.  First, notice that our example is an especially easy 
one with which to work because B is the only apparent deviation from the straight line formed 
by parties A ,  C, D and E. But consider Figure 2, which portrays the outcome of Russia's most 
recent parliamentary elections (December 1995) for the ten largest parties. If, as with Figure 1 ,  
we assume that the true line occasioned by the random process that justifies expression (2) passes 
through the largest and smallest parties, we must conclude that all remaining parties except the 
pro-government Our Home Is Russia (NDP) lost votes through fraud. But even if we ignore the 
statistical issues that arise when trying to determine whether a 'deviation' is significant, there are 
at least four other possible calculations that Figure 2 allows. Specifically, rather than assume, 
a priori , that the 'true' line passes through the largest and smallest parties, we could assume 
instead that 
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the true line should pass through the two largest parties (line 2), in which case we would 
infer that fraud benefitted everyone except the Communists (KPRF), Zhirinovsky's LDPR, 
and Women of Russia (WoR) ; 
the true line should pass through the six smallest parties (line 3), in which case we would 
infer that fraud benefitted the four largest parties ; 
the true line is the one that statistically best f its the data (line 4) -- the line that minimizes 
the sum of squared distances between predicted and actual outcomes -- in which case we 
would infer that votes were stolen from Women of Russia and the LDPR and added to 
the Communists and Our Home Is Russia. 
the true line should ignore the parties that fail to secure parliamentary representation. 
Since only the four largest parties surpassed the 5% threshold, this line would look much 
like line 4 and again we would conclude that fraud benefited Our Home Is Russia . 
Matters become more complicated still if fraud is sufficiently great so as to change the rank order 
of parties. Take the example from Figure I and suppose that 95,000 votes, and not merely 45,000, 
had been fraudulently added to B's total. In this case the graph of log(R) versus log(vote) is the 
one shown in Figure 3, so that now we would mistakenly conclude that it was party A and not 
B that had benefitted from the fraud. 
It is evident, then, that until we make some additional assumptions we cannot infer much of 
anything from such an analysis. Specifically, we must know at least the following : (I) the true 
rank order of the parties ; (2) the parties that did not benefit from fraud; and (3) the 'relevant' 
parties. Insofar as Russia is concerned, Sobyanin and his associates implicitly or explicitly 
supply us with the requisite assumptions: all electoral fraud in the 1 993 Russian party-list Duma 
elections favored communists and nationalists, Russia's Choice ranked first in most regions, and 
all but the smallest two or three parties are relevant. In addition, neither Russia's Choice (RC) 
nor the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) benefitted from fraud and thus , when applying 
expression (2), we should use these two parties to identify the 'true' relationship between log(R) 
and log(vote).2 
Armed with these assumptions, consider Figure 4, which is constructed using officially 
reported national tot.als. However, rather than merely draw a straight line between 'RC' and 
'DPR', we need to move 'RC' horizontally to the left and the LDPR horizontally to the right to 
accommodate the assumption that Russia's Choice actually ranked first. The resulting straight line 
suggests , then, that Zhirinovsky (LDPR) benefitted most from fraud, the Communists (KPRF) 
next, Yabloko third , and the Agrarians (APR) fourth. If we assume, moreover, that without fraud, 
the Communists would have ranked fourth, behind Women of Russia (WoR), and that the 
Agrarians would have ranked behind Yabloko, we would conclude that Zhirinovsky's vote was 
doubled by the addition of approximately 6 million fraudulent ballots, that the Communists 
gained 2 million votes, and that the Agrarians gained nearly 2 million -- for a total of 
2 We shall ignore the argument here that Russia's Choice had several million votes 
stolen from it and that the application of expression (2) requires an upwards 
adjustment in that party's vote. 
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approximately 10 million fraudulent ballots.3 
The surprising thing here, then, is that this adaptation of the log-log model gives us 
approximately the same estimate of the magnitude of fraud as Sobyanin's initial back-of-the­
envelope calculation. 
But one important difficulty with this method is the ad hoc nature of the assumption that 
Zhirinovsky's LDPR was the primary beneficiary of fraud, with some added ballots going as well 
to communists and, to a lesser extent, Women of Russia and Shakrai. Even still, the application 
of this methodology leads to strange conclusions when we look at the 88 separate regions ( oblasts 
and republics) that participated in the election. 
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Russia's Choice officially ranked first in ten regions, with virtually perfect straight line 
fits describing three of them (Perm, Sverdlovsk, and the Taymyr Okrug), fraud indicated 
as favoring Zhirinovsky in five (Karelia, Nenets, Tomsk, Y aroslavsk, and Cheliabinsk), 
fraud indicated as favoring Zhirinovsky and Y ablonko in St. Petersburg, and fraud 
indicated as working against Zhirinovsky in Moscow. Thus, we might ask : Why did fraud 
favor a Nazi extremist in those regions in which Russia's Choice was strongest? 
Shakrai's party ranked first in four regions (Gornii Altay, Buryatia, Tuva, and the 
Kabardin Republic), but unless we assume that votes were stolen in Buryatiya from 
Yablonko, we would infer that Zhirinovsky, Russia's Choice, Women of Russia, and the 
Communists all benefitted from fraud there, as well as in Gornyi Altay, whereas in Tuva, 
votes were stolen from Zhirinovsky or added to the totals reported for Shakrai's list. 
Fifty one of the remaining 74 regions give no evidence of fraud -- virtually straight lines 
describe the log-log relationship among the first six or seven ranked parties. Only by 
assuming that the LDPR or Communists actually ranked second can we infer fraud in any 
form, in which case, of course, it is not expression (2) that allows us to detect fraud, but 
our a priori assumptions. 
Twenty three regions do not fit expression (2) , and there the evidence for fraud points in 
a variety of directions. We can infer fraud if we assume that Russia's Choice actually 
came in first in each of these regions, but in Primorskii, for example, we would at the 
same time infer that fraud helped both LDPR and Women of Russia and that Women of 
Russia benefitted from fraud in the Jewish Autonomous region, the Urdmurt republic, 
Yavalo-Nenets, Chabarovkii, and Archagenslkaya, but that votes were stolen from it in 
Murmansk. 
This calculation gives a larger estimate of fraud than the one offered by Sobyanin and 
his colleagues. However, that estimate assumes that votes (approximately 2 million) 
were also stolen from Russia's Choice, in which case we should not only move 
Russia's Choice horizontally to the right, to first place, but also up, to accommodate 
the 'stolen' votes. Such a move has the effect of diminishing the vertical distance 
between the predicted line and the votes received by the Communists , LDPR, and 
Agrarians. Our reanalysis also fails to accommodate the possibility that the rank orders 
among other parties were changed by fraud. 
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Thus, instead of generating a coherent picture, the application of expression (2) to each 
region separately results is a range of conclusions. This, of course, can mean that different parties 
benefitted in different ways in different regions and rayons, depending on the sympathies of local 
and regional administrators . But if that is true, then before we can have any confidence in a 
region-by-region application of expression (2), we must also append some statistical model to it 
that allows us to accept or reject alternative hypotheses. Otherwise, stories as to why one pattern 
emerges in one region and not another amounts to little more than seeing dogs, cats, and cows 
in cloud formations. 
3. Theoretical Causes of Deviations from Linearity 
Because we must know several things a priori, including the true rank order of the 
relevant parties, the application of expression (2) to other elections cannot be an all-purpose 
methodology for detecting or measuring fraud. Also, the incoherent picture we see when we 
consider each of the 88 Russian regions that participated in the election tells us that a statistical 
structure needs to be developed so that we can say when a deviation is significant and whether 
one region is significantly different from another . If a stochastic model underlies expression (2), 
then before its application can be taken as a methodology for detecting fraud, we must use that 
model to derive statistics for our estimates . However, even if we do our statistical homework, 
and even if we believe that we can secure the a priori information necessary to apply this 
method, there is an additional difficulty . Specifically, there are good reasons for supposing that 
expression (2) applies only under very special circumstances and that a coherent pattern of 
deviations from it will emerge 'naturally', without fraud. 
Looking again at the relationship between firm size and rank, we do not find a linear fit 
but instead a concave curve in which mid-sized firms are larger than predicted. In their analysis 
of this fact, Ijiri and Simon ( 1 97 4) note that two things can explain this 'distortion' -- smaller 
firms that are more likely than larger ones to be absorbed by mergers and larger firms that hold 
an advantage when it comes to growing through mergers and acquisitions. Hence, if we move 
back to the political realm, Ijiri and Simon's analysis suggests that things other than fraud can 
move things away from a linear relationship -- the inherent advantages of larger parties to raise 
funds and advertise, voter unwillingness to support parties with little chance of winning seats, 
and the desire on the part of established politicians to be on the list of a viable party rather than 
on a list that has little chance of passing the 5% threshold for representation .  
Ijir i  and Simon's analysis is consistent with what we find in Russia . In virtually every 
region, the log graph of party strength and rank is concave if we include those parties that failed 
to surpass the 5% threshold. Such parties exhibit a sharp drop off in support so that all but the 
smallest ones lie above a straight line connecting the strongest and weakest parties . This fact is 
important . A considerable literature suggests that electoral systems exert systematic pressures on 
politicians (see, for example, Duverger 1954, Rae 197 1 ,  Lijphart 1984, Taagepera and Shugart 
1 989, Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994) , and that among these pressures is the disincentive to vote 
for uncompetitive parties in accordance with the election law's implied definition of 
'uncompetitive' . Thus, although one might argue that Russia's early election returns were 
dictated largely by stochastic things in conformity with whatever stochastic model rationalizes 
expression (2), the concavity in the regional log-log graphs in Russia's first election suggests 
that those pressures have begun to operate even there. 
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Elections, moreover, are not markets , and electoral systems can exert systematic 
influences on the number and size of parties that need not generate even a simple concave 
relationship between rank and size. To see what we mean empirically, consider Figure 5, which 
graphs the log of party strength against the log of rank for four selected West German elections 
( 1949, 1 965, 1 976, and 1987) -- a country with an electoral system that differs from Russia's 
only in some details (albeit important ones) . Notice that a nearly linear relationship holds in 
1 949, but that by 1 965 we can detect a step-function relationship in which the two strongest 
parties are approximately equal in strength, the third and fourth ranked parties are approximately 
equal, and the two smaller parties are decidedly weaker than the rest. This pattern maintains itself 
in 1 976 and 1 987 except that in '87, there are three parties at the second level. Thus, in West 
Germany at least, we need to assume either that the assumptions supporting expression (2) 
became less valid as the political system matured or that maturity led to greater fraud. 
A similar patter holds in Israel, which also utilizes a single national district constituency for 
elections to its lower legislative chamber, the Knesset. An approximately linear relationship 
holds from 1 949 until about 1 965 (see Figures a and b for two selected years) . But by 1 969 (see 
Figure c) a stepped pattern emerges, and, as Figure d. shows, becomes wholly evident in 1 984 
(it is tempting, of course, to suggest that, in contrast to West Germany, the large number of 
parties at  the second level is  the consequence of an irrelevant threshold for representation) . 
Perhaps as evidence, however, that things other than the long-term processes occasioned by 
election laws can shape this relationship, Figure 7 shows that the stepped relationship disappeared 
(at least temporarily) in 1 992. Whatever the cause of this late change in Israel, we would infer 
that a simple linear relationship is more likely to hold in an emerging democracy than in an 
established one. There are good theoretical reasons for this inference. Specifically, suppose the 
following four conditions hold : 
the election concerns a single issue such as left-right or liberal conservative , 
alternative policies on this issue can be represented by a straight line, and each voter can 
be identified with a specific point on this line (the voter's ideal point) , 
party platforms are also denoted by points on the issue, and voters vote for the party 
whose platform is closest to their ideal, and 
the election , as in Russia, Germany, and Israel , entails party-list voting and encourages 
more than two parties. 
Under these assumptions, if there is a platform for each party such that no party prefers to change 
its platform unilaterally (the platforms are in equilibrium), then parties should spread out and pair 
up along the issue (see for example Shepsle and Cohen 1990 for a general survey of the 
literature) . Pairing keeps a party from moving toward the center away from its twin : If it tries 
to move, it not only loses support to its twin, but it encourages the twin to follow it so as to 
eventually squeeze it out between the twin and the next adjacent party . The result, then, can be 
a reduction of the party's support below the representation threshold. Spreading out in pairs, 
on the other hand, reduces the chances that new entrants can find a niche with which to enter the 
political fray . 
The existence of an equilibrium may be problematical and may be the consequence of 
things exogenous to our simple model (e.g., partisan loyalties and the informational limitations 
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of voters) . It is also true that the number of parties that exist in equilibrium will depend on the 
details of the election law, the most important being the number of seats filled in each election 
district and the magnitude of any threshold that must be passed to secure representation. The 
relevant thing here, though, is that if voter ideal points on the issue are symmetrically and 
unimodally distributed about the median of the population, then the one or two parties at the 
median will get a slightly larger share of the votes than the rest, the four parties to the 
immediate right and left of center will all get the same vote, the four parties to their right and 
left will get the same slightly diminished share, and so on.4 Thus, if we graph the strength of 
parties (or its log) against rank (or its log), we should see a step function rather than the straight 
line described by expression (2). In addition, if an electoral system such as Israel's encourages 
a great many parties , then it is reasonable to conjecture that the differences in the support 
received by each of the smaller parties will by barely if at all noticeable so as to produce the 
single step we observe in the Israeli data . 
Of course, we can predict a stepped relationship only in equilibrium -- a circumstance 
unlikely to prevail in the early stages of party development. So we should not be surprised that 
it takes several elections before such a relationship becomes fully evident in West Germany. Nor 
should we be surprised that it takes longer for it to appear in Israel , since, with a virtually 
non-existent threshold for representation, its election law offers the greatest encouragement for 
the formation and maintenance of minor parties -- an encouragement that can only slow or even 
wholly disrupt the processes whereby party systems achieve equilibrium. Similarly , it is 
foolhardy to argue that Russia's infant party system is anywhere close to equilibrium -- 13 parties 
on the ballot in 1 993 and 43 in 1995 hardly bespeaks of equilibrium. If we had confidence in 
the other ad hoc assumptions required to apply expression (2), an approximately linear 
relationship between rank and size might be a viable prediction for fraudulent free elections in 
Russia for the immediate future. But, as we note earlier, the sharp drop off in support received 
by the smallest parties signals the influence of at least one aspect of Russia's electoral law -- the 
5% threshold for representation . More generally, though , our argument is that since we do not 
know all things that can lead a party system away from linearity, we must conclude that although 
fraud might have occasioned the deviations from linearity we observe in Russia, other things do 
so as well and we cannot exclude the possibility that these other things did not shape competition 
in even Russia's first democratic parliamentary election so as to vitiate the relevance of 
expression (2). 
4. Turnout and the Constitutional Referendum 
. Although the initial estimate of the scale of electoral fraud rested on the application of 
expression (2), subsequent analyses (Sobyanin and Suchovolsky 1 995, Myagkov and Sobyanin 
1 995) sought additional evidence from various patterns in the relationship between turnout and 
4 Of Course, different patterns of support will appear, depending on the distribution of 
voter preferences. For example , if preferences are bimodally distributed,  we can 
conjecture that the two or four strongest parties will get approximately equal shares of 
the vote. The precise relationship between election law, distribution of preferences, and 
support for parties by rank is an unexplored theoretical issue . 
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support for parties , candidates, and the constitution. And although searching for patterns that 
might be labeled 'anomalous' is difficult because Russia has never officially published district 
level electoral statistics for the December 1 993 elections, Sobyanin has compiled rayon-level 
results for a subset of regions that encompass more than 800 rayons in 23 of 88 regions, and 
which account for 30.6 million votes, or approximately 28 .8% of the electorate .5 
In analyzing this and official regional data, we can begin with the argument that true turnout 
fell short of  the 50% threshold required to render the constitutional referendum legitimate. An 
immediate difficulty here, though, is that individual regions appeared to behave no differently in 
December 1 993 than in previous elections . Looking at turnout in the 1 99 1  presidential election, 
the April 1 993 referenda balloting, and the December 1 993 Constitutional referendum, Table I 
shows that turnout varies significantly across and within regions in all three cases and that 
although turnout decreases over time, this decline is rather proportional across the country . There 
is a significant correlation by region from one election to the next -the correlation between 
turnout in April and December 1 993 is 0 .88,  between 199 1 and April 1993, 0.89, and between 
1 99 1  and December 1 993, 0 .84 -- so that, in addition to being able to make reasonably accurate 
predictions about relative regional turnout rates in December 1 993 on the basis of turnout in 
either 1991  or April 1 993, we can also predict that the December election would produce regions 
with low turnout (below 50 percent) as well as regions with high turnout (more then 70 percent) . 
It follows that any assertion of uniformly low turnout requires rationalizing significant fraud in 
1 99 1  and April 1 993 -- a less tenable assumption than that such fraud occurred primarily in 
December 1 993 since it is only in this last election that regional political bosses had a clear 
incentive to pad the numbers in a particular way . 
However, the argument for fraud is deeper than the observation that regions varied 
significantly in their reported turnout rates or that any increase in turnout above 50% is the 
consequence of added ballots. Focusing on rayon election returns and, first, on the constitutional 
referendum, Myagkov and Sobyanin ( 1995, but see also Sobyanin and Suchovolsky 1995) look 
at the relationship between turnout, T, and the product of T and the percent of the vote cast in 
favor of the Constitution,  TxVr. The variable TxVr = Er is the percentage of eligible voters who 
voted in support of the Constitution, and at first glance it seems reasonable to suppose that any 
increase in T should generate an increase in Er (as well as in Ea the percentage of the electorate 
voting against the constitution) : Although additional voters might aid the opposition if a majority 
of them prefer the opposition, some non-zero percentage should hold the opposite preference so 
as to engender a positive correlation between T and Er. However, if we look at the data for the 
876 rayons in their data set with respect to the constitutional referendum we find little correlation 
between T and Er (see Figure 8a), whereas if we look at T and Ea, we find a strong positive 
relationship (see Figure 8b). Myagkov and Sobyanin's ( 1995) inference is that the difference in 
patterns portrayed in Figures 9a and 9b is an anomaly that supports the hypothesis of electoral 
falsification in the form of added ballots marked against the constitution. 
5 Although the data is unofficial and generated at the rayon level by aggregating data 
supplied by members of local electoral commissions, comparison of these data with 
official results reveals no significant discrepancies . That is, the reports of local 
officials and the Central Electoral Commission appear to be consistent . 
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There are, though, other explanations and other ways of looking at the data.6 To begin 
with, notice that the rationale for supposing that T and Er will be positively related consists of 
a comparison of the same voting district at two different point in time. If an election district at 
time t yields a turnout rate of T(t) and support for fat Er(t'), and if at some other time t' we find 
T(t') > T(t) , then it seems only reasonable to assume that Er(t') will be greater than Er(t) . 
Although the increased turnout may have produced proportionately more voters who vote a, we 
would expect some of the additional turnout to contain voters who vote f But this is not the 
comparison being made in Myagkov and Sobyanin' s analysis. Instead, the comparison is among 
different districts at the same time. A weak or negative correlation between T and Er might be 
deemed anomalous, then, only if we assume that our data is homogeneous -- that every 
observation is like any other except for the variables measured. 
Homogeneity, though, is an assumption and not a fact, and it is, indeed, a critically 
important assumption. To see this, consider the example in Figure 9a, which portrays the 
relationship between turnout, T, and simply the percentage of the vote for and against some 
measure for four hypothetical voting districts. In this example we assume simply that the two 
higher turnout districts are more likely to oppose the measure being voted on, whereas support 
for the measure is strongest in the two low turnout districts. Thus, the correlation between T and 
Va is positive whereas the correlation between T and Vr is simply the negative of the first 
correlation. Now consider Figure 9b, which graphs Er and Ea against T. There are at least three 
things to note about the recalculated data here. First, the variance of the data corresponding to 
Er is greater than the variance of the data corresponding to Ea. Second, and as a consequence of 
the first thing, the correlation between T and Er is less than the correlation between T and E. In 
fact, if district 3 is not an individual district but, say, 100 districts, then the correlation between 
T and Er is actually negative . Finally, notice that the data in Figure 9b is heteroskedastic (the 
variance increases with T), in which case using a simple linear model to estimate regression or 
correlation coefficients is problematical and can yield inappropriate inferences about the 
significance of coefficients. 
To see that these problems are endemic to the method and not a mere consequence of our 
example, let the true relationship between the vote for or against a motion, V, and turnout be 
given by the expression 
V= a+ �T 
Hence, 
and 
E =a+ �T2 
[)E/()T = a + 2�T 
6 We should also note hat if falsification is the consequence of opposition to reform and 
the desire of regional leaders to be elected to the Federation Council, we should 
anticipate finding stronger evidence of falsification in December 1 993 than in, say, 
1 99 1. If fact, we find the opposite. Although the correlation between T and Er is 
nearly zero (-0. 12) in December 1 993, the correlation in 1 '99 1 between T and T times 
the vote for Yelstin is -0 . 1 9. 
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It follows from this expression that if a and� are both positive (e .g . ,  if the vote against a motion 
increases with turnout), then oE/oT is necessarily positive. On the other hand, if � is negative 
(e.g. , if the vote for the motion decreases with turnout, as in the Russian case), then oE/oT is 
positive only if T is less than a/2�. The predicted relationship between T and Ef, then, is not 
linear or even positive and monotonic ; instead, if turnout is sufficiently high for a sufficiently 
great number of observations, then a simple linear model would yield a negative estimate of the 
relationship between T and Ef, and a weaker relationship overall between T and Ef than between 
T and Ea. 
One need not assume that a simple linear function such as expression (3) describes the 
relationship between V and T for problems to arise in the interpretation of the correlation (or its 
absence) between Ef and T. All we require is for Vf to bear some monotonic relationship to T. 
In this event, either Vf or Va must bear a decreasing relationship, so that when we multiply the 
variable bearing the decreasing relationship and T (which is, of course, increasing with T),  we 
open the door ,  as an artifact of simple algebra, to a non-monotonic relationship between T and 
either Ef or Ea. Whether non-monotonicity actually characterizes the data will depend on the 
range of values T assumes in the data and the strength of the relationship between T and Va. That 
is , 
if T assumes only relatively low values such as is typical in most U.S. elections, the 
relationship between T and Ef as well as T and Ea, will be positive ; 
if T assumes only high values, such as was the case in the most recent Quebec 
referendum on separatism, and if T and Vf bear a sufficiently strong (negative) 
relationship, then the correlation between T and Ef can be negative; and 
if T varies widely and if T and Vf, again bear a sufficiently strong (negative) relationship 
to each other , then the relationship between T and Ef will not be monotonic , and estimates 
of this relationship based on a simple linear model will be unreliable if not meaningless. 
These possibilities are important for any conclusions we might offer about fraud in Russia's 
December 1 993 elections. First, we see here that we should not anticipate the same relationship 
between Ef and T as we observe between Ea and T. In and of itself , the differences between 
Figures 8a and 8b hold no implications for fraud. Second, before deeming the relationship 
between Ef and T 'anomalous' we must first assess whether there are variables that intervene 
between the decision to vote and the choice of how to vote that might influence the relationship 
between T and Vf sufficiently to make the observed relationship between T and Ef dependent on 
the range of values T assumes in our data. Indeed, later we argue that some if not all of the 
'anomalous' relationship between T and Ef can be explained by the fact that, at least for Russia, 
urban and rural voters appear to act somewhat differently in that urban voters are less likely to 
vote than are rural ones and rural ones are more likely to be conservative than urban voters. 
Finally , even if we conclude somehow that fraud accounts for some of the observed relationship 
between T and Er, calculating its magnitude requires that we first subtract out the influence of 
any unobserved variables that establish a 'natural' relationship between T and Vf. 
One might object, of course, with the argument that too strong a negative relationship 
between Vf and T is required to produce the zero correlation we observe between Ef and T. But 
here we can offer an indirect assessment of the likelihood that fraud and not some third variable 
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accounts for the observed relationship between T and Er. Regardless of what we might think 
causes Vr and T to correlate 'naturally', we have little reason to believe that T and the share of 
invalid (blank or improperly marked) ballots should correlate significantly. And unless the 
fraudulent ballots cast by those who implemented fraud were otherwise invalid (blank or 
improperly marked), by artificially increasing turnout, fraudulent ballots cast against or in favor 
of the constitution should produce a negative correlation between T and Einvauct· However, if we 
look at the next-to-the-last column of Table II we see that such a correlation appears in only four 
of 23 regions, thereby seriously undermining the contention that fraud was extensive in a majority 
of regions. 
There is, in fact, on additional reason to be suspicious of any inference of fraud from figures 
such as Figures Sa and Sb -- aggregation error. Although the rationale for predicting a positive 
correlation between T and Er is based on a consideration of the likelihood of individual actions, 
Myagkov and Sobyanin's conclusions rest on data aggregated across the entire country. 
However, if the method is correct and if fraud in the form of ballots added to defeat the 
constitution is pervasive, we should find the same pattern within regions. However, looking 
again at Table II, we see that although only three regions in 199 1 exhibited a positive correlation 
between T and T times support for Yeltsin, and although only ten regions did so in April 1993, 
T and Er correlate positively in 20 out of 23 regions in December 1993. 
These are not uniformly strong correlations (our preceding discussion suggests that they 
would not be strong owing to a true non-linear relationship), but they do suggest an interesting 
explanation for the zero aggregate correlation that corresponds to Figure Sb. To take an extreme 
possibility, suppose there are three regions and that each consists of three rayons. Suppose 
turnout in region l's rayons is 30, 35, and 40%, that it is 45, 50, and 55% in the three rayons of 
region 2, and that it is 60, 65, and 70% in region 3's three rayons. Finally, suppose support for 
the proposition in question, Vp is 20, 15, and 10 in the first, second, and third regions 
respectively. Then a region-by-region graph of Er against T would produce three positively 
sloping lines that, despite the perfect correlation within each region, would generate a zero 
aggregate correlation . 
Something like this occurs in Russia. Looking at support for the constitution and excluding 
the 5 regions for which the correlation between T and Er is negative or essentially zero, Figure 
1 Oa graphs the overall relationship between T and Er across all rayons in the remaining l S 
regions of our data. Notice that the cloud of data here is not much different than the cloud 
reported by Myagkov and Sobyanin (compare Figure lOa with Figure 9a). However, after 
disaggregating the data by region, Figure 1 Ob graphs the best fit lines for the relationship between 
T and Er for each of these lS regions, and reveals a pattern not unlike our example -- a set of 
nearly parallel, positively sloping lines. Thus, although we cannot reject the hypothesis that a 
good many of these slopes are not significantly different from zero, it is the case that the 
'anomaly' of a zero or negative overall correlation between T and T times support for the 
constitution is a consequence of different turnout rates across regions rather than of the absence 
of a within-region relationship between T and Er. 
We have, then, a simple explanation for what is offered as an 'anomaly' in the aggregate data 
that does not require any exceptional negative relationship between Vr and T. But there are still 
the five regions in which the correlation between T and Er is negative or zero. One possibility, 
of course, is that such correlations are but the logical consequence of expression (3). That is, 
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recall that if the correlation between Vr and T is sufficiently negative owing to some third 
intervening variable (e.g. , % urban), then if T is sufficiently high, the correlation between Er and 
T will be negative as well. In fact, this is what we observe in the data. Specifically, as predicted 
by a fraud-free model, the correlation between average turnout in a region and the slope of the 
linear regression line between T in the region and Er is negative -equals - .72. One might argue, 
of course, that turnout is greater in those regions in which the relationship between T and Er is 
'anomalous' (i.e. , not strongly positive),  but the point here is that if we take as our null model 
the hypothesis that the December 1993 election was relatively fraud free, or at least that ballots 
were not uniformly added to the total and cast against the constitution, then on the basis of the 
methodology offered, we cannot reject that hypothesis , nor can we use the method to measure 
the magnitude of fraud.7 
This same argument applies, of course, to the analysis of party list voting in the December 
elections. But before we tum to those elections and before we consider more fully the possible 
influence of differences between urban and rural voters , we want to offer an additional hypothesis 
about why we might observe a zero or negative correlation between T and Er -- a hypothesis that 
once again illustrates the importance of taking into account the rules under which elections are 
held. To begin , notice that, aside from the cost of voting, those who favored the constitution had 
a dominant strategy -- vote 'for' -- since a yes vote increased turnout so as to render the 
referendum legitimate and increased the likelihood of an overall affirmative vote. On the other 
hand, the decision for people opposed to the constitution is more complicated owing to the 
requirement that at least 50% of the eligible electorate vote. If such a person believes that the 
vote will be close and that turnout will exceed the legal threshold, then he or she should vote 
against the document. If such a voter believes that the vote will be close and that turnout will 
be near 50%, then voting against and abstaining may be equally good choices. And if this person 
believes that a clear majority of likely voters will support the constitution but that turnout will 
be near 50%, then the dominant choice is to abstain since voting only increases turnout and 
increases the likelihood that the Constitution is ratified. 
Voters opposed to Yeltsin, then, can express their dissatisfaction in two ways -to vote against 
the constitution or to abstain, where the optimal choice depends on beliefs that could only be 
weakly supported by public opinion polls. For purposes of an example, consider an election with 
9 voters , and suppose 4 supporters of the document abide by their dominant strategy and vote 
7 One might object to the preceding discussion of aggregation error with the observation 
that the within-region correlations between T and E1 are not always significantly 
different from zero. But such an objection in effect takes the existence of fraud as the 
null model and thereby subverts the original purpose of the methodology -- to detect 
and measure fraud when we have no other definitive evidence of its existence. On the 
other hand, if the null hypothesis is that the election is fraud-free, then we should test 
whether negative relationships between T and E1 are significantly different from some 
positive number. However, since we do not know what that number is (barring a 
separate data base that tell us the true relationship between V1and T) and thus, aside 
from issues of heteroskedasticity and the inappropriateness of a linear model, we 
cannot hypothesis test in this instance. 
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'for', opponents should prefer to coordinate their actions so that either all abstain or all vote 
'against'. Thus, Yeltsin's opponents confront a coordination problem that, if there are several 
such districts, is likely to be solved one way in some districts, another way in other districts, and 
not at all in the remaining districts . The overall result , though, is a negative correlation between 
the vote and turnout , a zero correlation between support for the constitution and turnout times 
support for the constitution, and a positive correlation between opposition to the constitution and 
turnout times opposition. 
5 .  The Party List Elections 
Absent additional evidence, we cannot assert that the preceding theoretical argument accounts 
for the negative correlations between T and Er we observe in the five regions of our sample . And 
although it is true that this argument should increase our awareness of the possibility that patterns 
in the data labeled anomalous may be little more than the logical consequence of the rules under 
which referenda are held, the difficulty with this argument in the present context is that it applies 
only to the December 1993 election, and then only to the constitutional referendum. What of the 
other contests on the ballot in December 1993? Here the evidence for fraud appears to be 
stronger, at least with respect to the party list balloting. First, consider again Table II, which in 
the fourth column shows by region the correlation between turnout, T, and EcAL ( = T times the 
percentage vote for Communists + Agrarians + LDPR) ; in the fifth column shows the correlation 
between T and ERc (= T times the vote for Russia's Choice) ; and in the sixth column shows the 
correlation between T and E0 (= T times the vote for all nine remaining parties). These 
correlations more clearly and uniformly correspond to the pattern Sobyanin labels an anomaly 
-- significant positive correlations between T and EcAL but near-zero or negative correlations 
between T and ERc and between T and E0• 
Since Table II disaggregates the data by region, we cannot explain the absence of significant 
positive correlations in the third and fourth columns as the consequence of aggregating data 
across regions. Nor can we explain things by referring, as we did in the case of the 
constitutional referendum, to the different optimal strategies of opponents and supporters of 
reform -- all voters have as their dominant strategy the choice of voting for their most preferred 
party (adjusted for the likelihood that the party would surpass the 5% threshold for 
representation). Finally , notice that if we take these numbers and combine them with the results 
from the previous section concerning the constitutional referendum, we can infer a more 
believable scenario of fraud than even the one Sobyanin offers. Specifically, rather than assume 
that rayon officials opposed to reform, when adding votes to the Communist , Agrarian or LDPR 
party lists , added votes against the constitution, we can assume instead that they simply scattered 
votes between the 'for' and 'against' positions on the referendum so as to increase turnout and 
keep their overseers in the Kremlin satisfied. 
However, we must still confront the methodological and theoretical issues occasioned by 
expression (3), which imply that it is incorrect to assume a priori that a zero or negative 
correlation is an anomaly. That such correlations can arise "naturally " as a consequence of the 
relationship between V and T is evident when we look at election returns from other countries. 
For example, higher turnout in Poland's 1990 elections aided the rightist Democratic Union (the 
correlation between vote for DU and turnout is + 0.48) but hurt the leftist Polish Peasants' Party 
(the correlation here is - 0.25). I n  Ukraine's 1994 presidential election, the correlation between 
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T and T times the vote for Kravchuk was +0.74 whereas the correlation between T and T times 
support for Kuchma was -0.46. In Bulgaria's 1994 parliamentary elections, the correlations 
between T and T times support for the leftist People's Alliance and the dominant BSP coalition 
were positive, but the correlations for the three other parties receiving significant electoral 
support (Alliance of Democratic Forces, Bulgarian Business Block, and Democratic Alternative 
for the Republic) were either zero or negative. 
Of course, one might argue that fraud was pervasive in Poland, Ukraine, and Bulgaria for the 
same reasons it was pervasive in Russia -- a poorly developed technology and administration for 
counting votes. But in the 1984 Canadian elections, provinces with the highest turnout yielded 
the weakest support for the Liberal Party (r = -0 .50), so that the correlation between turnout and 
the percentage of the total number of eligible voters who supported the Liberal Party is zero. 
Indeed, Canada offers an especially salient example of a strong positive correlation between T 
and Ea but a negative correlation between T and its opposite, Er. Taking the aggregate outcomes 
in the province's 125 election districts as our observations, Figures l la and l lb graph turnout 
in Quebec's most recent ( 1995) separatist referendum against T times the vote for separation (Er) 
and T times the vote against separation (Ea) respectively. · Once again, the correlation between 
T and Er is negative (-0.20) whereas the correlation between T and Ea is positive (+0.32). If we 
look again at Figure 1 la we should also note that the range of turnout in the Canadian data is 
relatively high between 84 and 97%. That is, it is in exactly the range were we would most 
likely expect, on the basis of our discussion in the previous section of expression (3), to see a 
negative fraud-free relationship between T and Er. Thus, if the relationship between T and ERc 
is not anomalous in Canada (and elsewhere) we cannot assume a priori that it is anomalous in 
Russia. 
However, accounting for such a relationship requires identifying a variable that intervenes 
between T and Vr so as to generate a negative correlation between T and Vr and a positive 
correlation between T and Va. And here, as even Myagkov and Sobyanin ( 1995) suggest, 
urbanization appears to be such a variable for Russia. 8 The relevance of this variable in Russian 
voting patterns is suggested by several studies based on aggregate regional data, which suggest 
that support for reform is concentrated in urban areas, whereas rural regions are more likely to 
oppose reform (Slider, Gimpelson and Chugrov 1994). Moreover, turnout also correlates with 
urban-rural distinctions. Approximately 78 percent of respondents to a post election survey from 
rural areas claimed to have taken part in the December 1993 election whereas only 69 percent 
8 In fact, to suppose otherwise is to suppose that Russia is somehow unique among post­
communist states. the pattern of greater support for leftist or anti-reform parties in 
rural areas has been observed in the Czech and Slovak republics (Obrman 1992), in 
Bulgaria (Ashley 1990 ; Koulov 1995), in Romania (Shafir 1992), in Albania 
(Szajkowski 1992) and in Hungary (Keri and Levendel 1995). In Poland's 1993 
elections we find a strong negative correlation (-0.68) between support for the pro­
reform Democratic Union and percent of rural in a province. Moreover, both turnout 
and support for conservative parties is reported to be higher in rural areas in Bulgaria 
(Krause 1995), Latvia (Bungs 1994), Slovakia (Fisher 1995), and Hungary (Oltav 
1995). 
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from cities with populations under 100,000 claim to have done so (Wyman et al 1994, 1995). 
Although this study, like most polls elsewhere, overestimates overall turnout, this pattern is 
reflected in the within-region data. For all three elections (see Table III), there is a significant 
correlation between turnout and the percent of the population in a rayon classified as rural (with 
the exception of Murmansk, where cities are populated largely by career military). At the same 
time, Table III reveals a negative correlation between the vote for Yeltsin and the percent of rural 
population in all regions in 199 1, in twelve regions in April 1993, and in all but one region in 
December 1993 (Sakhalin) . 
Although Myagkov and Sobyanin ( 1995) briefly consider the urban-rural distinction as an 
alternative explanation for the correlational patterns they label 'anomalous,' the relevance of this 
distinction goes beyond what even they or our discussion of expression (3) suggest. Specifically, 
in addition to opening the door to a 'natural ' negative correlation between T and ERc• it once 
again raises the issue of aggregation error. To see what we mean, consider Figure 12. Here, 
taking each rayon as an observation, we graph T versus ERc (= T times the vote for Russia 's 
Choice) in one particular region -- Krasnoyarsk. However, in this figure we denote those rayons 
with 10% or more rural population as rural or non-urban (labeled 'r') and those with less as 
urban (labeled 'u').  Figure 12 also graphs the best fit lines for those rayons labeled urban, for 
those labeled rural, and for the region taken as a whole. Notice once again the consequence of 
aggregation -- in this case across both types of rayons : although the correlation between T and 
ERc is positive for urban rayons and only slightly negative for the rest, it is more strongly 
negative when we combine these two populations . 
This consequence of aggregating across rayons that vary by percent urban accounts, in fact, 
for a good part of the 'anomalous ' character of the data that Table II reports. Specifically, 
consider Table IV, which gives the overall correlation between T and ERc as well as the 
correlation among rayons classified as urban and non-urban. The extreme possibility is 
illustrated, now, by Archangelk oblast, which produces a positive correlation in both urban and 
non-urban rayons, but which generates a negative correlation overall. More generally, however, 
notice that, excluding the four regions with too few urban observations, the overall correlation 
is less (more negative) than both the urban and non-urban correlations in 1 8  of the 19  remaining 
regions. Thus, we can attribute some part of the negative correlation between T and ERc in all 
but one of 19 regions to the aggregation of urban and non-urban rayons. 
Admittedly, the consequences of aggregation are less pronounced here than with the 
constitutional referendum. But Table IV does point to an inherent problem with attempting to 
infer anything from such correlations. Applying this method necessarily entails aggregation of 
some sort since we must compare turnout across different populations -- regions, rayons, 
precincts, or whatever . Thus, aggregation error and the influence of intervening variables such 
as urbanization can never be excluded as a potential explanation for whatever pattern we find. 
Indeed, it is not only that a negative correlation can arise from aggregation, by a positive one can 
arise as well. If there are three regions with three rayons, and if turnout rates in the first, second, 
and third rayons in each region are 20, 30, and 40% in region 1, 30, 40, and 50% in region 2, 
and 40, 50, and 60% in region 3, and if because of fraud or because of some additional 
aggregation issue, the correlation between T and Er is zero in all three regions, but if Er is . 1  in 
region 1, .2 in region 2, and .3 in region 3, then when we aggregate across regions, we would 
find a positive correlation overall. And because the proposed methodology for detecting fraud 
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requires aggregation, the possible existence of other intervening variables implies that we can 
infer little if anything a priori from a positive or negative correlation between T and Ef' It is not, 
as Myagkov and Sobyanin ( 1995) argue, that a negative correlation is an anomaly that, although 
consistent with other hypotheses, is suggestive of massive fraud. Both positive and negative 
correlations are consistent all of the alternative hypotheses,  so that no inference can be drawn 
from such correlations. 
6. Some Notes of Caution 
It remains true, of course, that the correlations reported in the second column of numbers in 
Table IV are nearly uniformly negative or insignificant so that, despite our arguments about 
aggregation error and the consequences of simple algebra, we cannot preclude the possibility that 
fraud is present. Here, though, we want to offer some notes of caution about alternative 
interpretations of the data . The f irst note concerns the magnitude of the fraud required to 
engender the correlations we do observe. Suppose, as Myagkov and Sobyanin suggest, that fraud 
is concentrated in rural rayons, and for purposes of an example, consider Krasnoyarsk kray again , 
along with Figure 12. Aside from the nearly uniformly higher turnout of rural rayons and the 
nearly uniformly lower support for Russia's Choice, notice that if turnout is artificially increased 
within a rayon as in our example, and if votes are giv�n only to Communists, Agrarians, or the 
LDPR ,  then the observation for that rayon moves only horizontally to the right. Thus, if we 
assume that the true correlation between T and ERc is of some "reasonable" order of magnitude 
(say 0 .50), then from this construction we can estimate the share of false ballots that must be 
added to the total of each rural rayon in order to produce the data shown in Figure 1 2. In this 
instance, in order to secure a correlation around 0 .50 and generate 'true' data like that shown in 
Figure 13, we must assume that approximately half the ballots cast in each rural rayon were fraud 
(or, equivalently, that the true turnout in rural rayons was half the level officially reported) . 
If we assume that some percentage of false ballots were cast also in urban rayons, then the 
percentage of false ballots in the rural rayons must be greater still. But even numbers like 50% 
and higher begin to strain credulity . This is especially so since to argue that the true relationship 
between T and ERc was positive and that true turnout in rural regions was lower than in urban 
areas stands in sharp contrast to the records of all other Russian elections, including the 
December 1995 ones. In all those elections, rural citizens again are officially reported to have 
voted with greater frequency that urban ones . 
Our second note of caution once again concerns invalid ballots . Earlier , when discussing the 
constitutional referendum, we note that it seems unreasonable to suppose that those who 
perpetrated fraud by adding their own ballots to the total so as to increase overall turnout did so 
by adding invalid ballots . If this argument is correct, then it is doubly so when it comes to the 
party lists since here the logroll referred to in our introduction requires more than a mere increase 
in turnout -- it requires that the added ballots be cast in a particular way, for communists and 
Zhirinovsky's LDPR.  So once again, if fraud in the form of added ballots is extensive, we should 
predict a negative correlation between T and Einvalid when looking at voting for party list . 
However, as the last column of Table II shows, we find such a correlation in only five of 23 
regions . In fact , when looking across all the correlations this table reports , we find that the 
methodology offered by Myagkov and Sobyanin ( 1995) allows us to make a strong case for fraud 
in only 4 or 5 regions -- Kirov, Kursk, Novgorod, and Tver oblasts , and perhaps Tula obl<}st . 
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Our third note of caution requires looking at our urban-rural analysis a bit differently and in 
a way the holds implications for the Federation Council elections . Consider Table V, which again 
classifies a rayon as non-urban if 10% or more of its population is rural and urban otherwise and 
which gives the average turnout figures in December 1993 for 'non-urban' and 'urban' rayons 
in each of the 23 regions in our sample . Table V also gives the average vote for Russia's Choice 
in these same rayons, as well as the difference in Russia's Choice's support. Note in particular 
that in every region, non-urban turnout is greater than urban turnout, and in every region, support 
for Russia's Choice is greater in urban rayons than elsewhere. 
The consistency of these differences poses a problem for arguments about the ultimate 
motivation for fraud in 1993 -- namely, ensuring the election of regional bosses to the Federation 
Council . Specifically, those bosses did not run in every region and did not uniformly win in those 
regions in which they did run. However, as Table VII shows, the pattern of correlation between 
the turnout and the turnout times the vote for the Constitution, for Russia's Choice, and for 
Yabloko is the same in all regions . Moreover, all regions exhibit the same pattern in the 
relationship of urban-rural, support for Russia's Choice, and turnout. Hence, a more consistent 
explanation for the absence of a correlation between T and T times support for some indicator 
of support for reform is that it is a consequence of the correlation between the relative 
conservatism of rural districts and turnout in those districts. 
Moreover, when we turn to the Federation Council elections, we find no consistent pattern 
in the relationship of T and T times support for regional leaders . Table VIII gives the correlations 
between turnout and the vote for the first, second and third-ranked candidates for the Council. 
If the primary motive for fraud was ensuring the election of regional bosses and their associates, 
the pattern we would predict is that the correlations between T and the vote for regional bosses 
would be uniformly strongly positive and that other candidates would suffer from this increased 
turnout. However, although such expectations are met in 9 of 15 regions in which local bosses 
won election to the Council, it is also the case that in 5 of those 9 regions, higher turnout is 
positively associated with a higher vote for their opponents. And in six regions, the correlation 
between the vote for local bosses and turnout is either negative or nearly zero . 
7. Conclusions 
It is at this point, of course, that we might want to rely on a more careful classification of 
regions, such as trying to identify those in which regional bosses were most likely to encourage 
fraud and those in which elections were allowed to be free and fair . For example, is the former 
Governor of Sverdlovsk in a position to manipulate the vote count -- thereby rendering this 
observation one that inconsistent with the maintained hypothesis of fraud -- or should we classify 
Sverdlovsk as a region in which the regional boss did not run? That is, is the ex-Governor of 
this oblast different from the former head of Briansk, where we do observe correlations that 
Myagkov and Sobyanin label anomalous? 
Regardless of how we approach the data on the Federation Council elections, there are two 
views one can take of the effort to identify irregularities in Russia's aggregate electoral data. 
One view takes irregularities as merely an indication of potential fraud that must be explored by 
other means before definitive conclusions can be reached. The second assumes that irregularities 
can be identified and quantified with sufficient precision so as to allow for the calculation of the 
extent and form of fraud. Although our analysis does not necessarily undermine the first view, 
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it finds the second indefensible, at least with respect to the two methodologies used to argue for 
the existence of pervasive fraud in Russia's December 1993 elections . 
First, although it likely that a stochastic model of voting and party competition can be 
developed that parallels Ijiri and Simon's ( 1974) theoretical analysis of firm size and that predicts 
a linear relationship between party rank and party support in accordance with expression (2), 
fraud is only one potential cause of deviations from such a prediction. As the data from West 
Germany and Israel suggest, the electoral system itself establishes incentives among candidates 
and voters that move a system away from linearity. Moreover, even if we accept the argument 
that expression (2) applies only to newly emerging democracies -- to political systems "out of 
equilibrium " -- the application of this expression requires a number of ad hoc assumptions that 
need independent validation. In this respect, perhaps the most critical assumption is that we must 
know whether fraud was extensive enough to alter the rank order of the parties and we must 
know the pre-fraud order. I f expression (2) can be used at all, it can be used only after these 
things are established, which, of course, defeats the original purpose of its application. 
The second methodology -- examining the correlation between turnout and turnout times 
support for one position or another -- is also fraught with methodological pitfalls, the most 
notable being that a negative or insignificant correlation can characterize honest as well as 
fraudulent elections . A negative or insignificant correlation can be a consequence not only of 
the way we aggregate our data, but also of the existence of an intervening variable that 
establishes a connection between T and V. Once again, such a methodology might prove useful, 
but only if we can preclude the existence of confounding things such as a correlation between 
preferences and some exogenous variable like percent rural or if we can somehow subtract the 
influence of such variables . In the Russian case at least there appears to be a strong enough 
correlation among percent rural, conservative preferences, and turnout that any estimate of the 
magnitude of fraud that overlooks such correlations is likely to seriously overestimate that 
magnitude. 
Finally, we reiterate that we are not arguing that Russia's elections did not place without 
significant fraud. Our arguments are intended primarily as notes of caution about using aggregate 
to quantify the magnitude of fraud. It should also be emphasized that we cannot apply the 
proposed methods by setting our null hypothesis equal to the proposition that there was fraud. 
Since, as we have tried to show, almost any pattern in the data is consistent with fraudulent as 
well as fraud-free elections, doing so defeats the purpose of the proposed methodologies - ­
detecting fraud when we are not certain it exists or are uncertain about its magnitude. And these 
are important methodological issues. Serious allegations have been made with respect to Russia's 
most recent elections (December 1995) -- allegations that might be used to justify canceling 
future elections or to proclaim the new Duma illegitimate . We can only urge that additional data 
be used directly to validate, invalidate, or refine the methodologies we question here. 
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Table I 
Turnout in 23 Russian Regions 
Region December 1 993 April 1 993 1 991 
Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
Krasnoyusk: Kray 0.51 77.05 34.38 0.61 80. 1 7  49.48 0.72 0.90 0.59 
Archangelk obi 0.54 68.46 47.21 0.66 82.05 56.30 0.74 0.83 0.68 
Briansk obi 0.64 I 83.29 55.35 0.68 87.29 55.25 0 .82 0.99 0 .73 
Vladimir obi 0.60 72.91 50.98 0.70 82. 1 6  62.68 0.80 0.89 0.73 
Vologod obi 0.59 76.95 52.27 0.69 85.52 59.73 0.77 0 .91  0.72 
Voroneg obl 0.59 83.45 47.50 0.73 90.76 60.26 0 .81  0 .94 0.71 
Kalinigrad obi 0.56 64.56 49.47 0.64 76.36 57.49 0.74 0.84 0.69 
Ki:mero obl 0.53 75.58 44.83 0.58 84 .53 43.37 0.70 0 .91  0 .62 
Kiro\• obl 0.58 78.51 47.55 0.72 86.56 58 .25 0.79 0 .98 0 .71  
Kursk obi 0.64 80.99 42.66 0.70 88.93 48.81 0.85 0.97 0 .67 
Magadan obi 0.48 63.89 43.44 0.58 75.94 50.63 0.67 0.83 0.61 
Murmansk obi 0.50 72.96 43.69 0.59 78.88 52.68 0.68 0.92 0.56 
Nignii Novgorod obi 0.52 78.85 43.36 n/a 78.85 43.36 0.76 0.99 0.67 
Novgorod obi 0.59 77.79 53.97 0.66 86.59 57 .69 0 .78 0.94 0.71 
Orenburg obi 0.55 79.95 39. 1 3  0.65 88. 1 4  50.94 0 .79 0.94 0 .64 
Penza obi 0.64 84.63 53.94 0.71 89.77 58.68 0.84 0.96 0.74 
Perml obi 0.44 60.34 39.35 0.59 69.92 55.29 0.71 0.87 0.67 
�aralov obi 0.58 84.59 47.97 0.68 91 .43 54.05 0 .78 0.97 0 .71  
Sachalinsk obi 0.50 63. 1 6  43.46 0.56 72.56 47.60 Q.70 0.85 0.65 
S\'crdlovsk obi 0.49 76.01 40.50 0.67 87.01 55.55 0.79 0.95 0.71 
Smolensk obi 0.65 81 .68 59.34 0.71 88 .60 6 1 . 1 3 0.83 0.96 0 .75 
·her obi 0.62 84.47 52.99 0.70 9 1 . 1 4  56.25 0.80 0 .94 0.68 
Tula obi 0.60 75.00 51 .98 0.68 83.98 .58.91 0.78 0.89 0.71 
Table I I  
Correlation between Turnout an d  V�te times Turnout 
1 991 
Krasnoyarsk Kray -0.32 
An:han(!dk ohl -0 .53 
I Jriansk ohl -0.57 
Vladimir ohl -0.39 
Volog1KI ohl -0. 3 5  
Voroncg ohl -0.69 
Ka linigratl ohl -0 .35 
Kcmcro ohl -0 65 
Kiro\' ohl -0.47 
Kursk ohl -0.32 
I\ 1:t [!.at.Inn oh I 0.23 
M11n11nnsk ohl -0.47 
Ni[!.nii No'' (!Orod obi -0.23 
No\'(!Orotl ohl -0.64 
( >rcnhur(! ohl -0 .53 
l'c1l711 obi -0.24 
l'cnul ohl -0.27 
Saralo\' obi -0.48 
Sachalinsk obi 0 .03 
S\·crtllo\'sk ohl 0.07 
Smolensk ohl -0.70 
l\'cr obi -0.69 
Tula ohl -0.73 
Parties 
April 1 993 Constitution Conservaties Russia's Choice All others 
0 .26 0.70 0.90 -0.40 -0.68 
-0.07 0.60 0.75 -0.1 5  -0.60 
-0. 1 4  0.27 0.81 -0 .4 1 -0.65 
0.2 1 . 0.50 0 .86 -0.38 -0 .69 
0. 1 4  0.69 0.83 -0. 1 4  -0.60 
-0.76 -0.05 0.94 -0.64 -0.79 
0.46 0.73 0.69 -0.20 -0.49 
-0 . 1 0  0.79 0.96 -0.58 -0.77 
-0. 1 7 0.22 0 .84 -0.29 -0.68 
-0.45 0. 1 7  0.96 -0.64 -0.87 
0.86 0.71  0.91 -0.40 0.1 7 
0.52 0 .80 0.87 -0. 1 2  -0.43 
0 .08 0 .08 0.91 -0.53 -0 .8 1 
0.37 0.85 0 .91 -0.49 -0.63 
-0.27 0.45 0.92 -0.60 -0.79 
-0.42 -0. 1 5  0.95 -0.61 . -0.82 
0.57 0.89 0.75 -0.1 6  -0.54 
-0.04 0.45 0.84 -0.3 1 -0.62 
0 .79 0 .80 0.58 0 .52 -0.07 
0.64 0.85 0.75 -0 .1 7 -0.65 
-0. 1 0  -0.30 0.94 -0.63 -0.83 
-0. 1 5 .  0.01 0.96 -0.79 -0.88 
-0.28 0.37 0.94 -0.74 -0.85 
Cons t i tu t ion P�rty List  
Inval id Inva lid 
0 . 4 1  0 . 5 8 
0 . 6 2 0 . 07  
o.  26 0 . 32 
0 . 34 0 . 44 
0 . 30 0 . 2 1  
0 .  1 4  0 . 1 6  
0 . 60 0 . 36 
-0 . 06 0 . 09 
-0 . 1 1  -0 . 24 
0 . 0 3 -0 . 06 
0 . 74 0 . 80 
0 . 6 7 o .  32 
0 . 3 1  0 . 4 1  
-0 . 1 8 -0 . 26 
0 . 26 0 . 36 
0 . 04 0 . 03 
0 . 50 0 . 3 2 
0 . 20 0 . 36 
o .  1 6  o .  1 6  
0 . 5 0 0 . 4 1  
0 . 04 0 . 75 
-0 . 48 -0 . 40 
0 . 05 -0 . 00 
Table m 
Correlation between the percent of Rural Population, Turnout and Support for Yeltsin 
Correlation between the Percent of Rural population and 
Vote for 
Turnout Yeltsin Communists 
1 991 April 93 Oec 93 1 991 April 93 Oec 93 Oec 93 
Krasnoyarsk Kray 0.68 o.n 0.79 -0.73 -0.04 -0.33 0.18 
Arcbangclk obi 0.52 0.78 0.73 -0.62 0.34 -0.25 023 
Briansk obi 0.83 0.80 0.81 -0.65 -021 -0.12 -0.05 
Vladimir obi 0.82 0.81 0.85 -0.63 0.02 -0.29 -0.05 
Vologod obi 0.78 0.82 0.76 -0.63 -0.04 -0.41 -0.17 
Voroncg obi 0.61 0.60 0.67 -0.53 -0.52 -0.65 0.22 
Kalinigrad obi 0.58 0.54 0.32 -0.70 -O:OS -0.1 0 -0.09 
K"-mcro obi 0.86 0.82 0.85 -0.72 -0.1 0  -0.22 0.00 
Kirov obi 0.61 0.68 0.63 -0.69 -026 -0.53 0.24 
Kursk obl 0.72 0.72 0.73 -0.58 -0.43 -0.40 028 
Magadan obi 0.71 0.79 0.84 -0.82 0.60 -0.22 0.68 
Murmansk obi -0.16 0.14 0.1 3  -0.07 -0.1 4  -0.29 0.33 
Nignii Novgorod obi 0.71 0.81 0.81 -0.72 -0.67 -0.67 0.48 
Novgorod obi 0.82 0.81 0.80 -0.72 0.37 -0. 1 1 0.40 
Orenburg obi 0.76 0.86 0.84 -0.83 -0.44 -0.61 0.01 
Penza obi 0.78 0.80 0.76 -0.71 -0.17 -0.39 0.17 
Penni obi 0.26 0.65 0.45 -a.n -0.1 1 -0.48 0.46 
Saratov obi 0.83 0.81 0.85 -0.68 -0.21 -0.48 0.1 8 
Sachalinsk obi 0.85 0.81 0.83 -0.57 0.52 0.12 -0.32 
Sverdlovsk obi 0.50 0.57 0.64 -0.62 0.04 -0.41 0.48 
Smolensk obi 0.71 0.67 0.58 -0.84 -0.36 -0.42 . 0.1 5 
Tvcr obl 0.80 0.80 0.71 -0.70 0.07 -0.32 -0 . 1 5  
Tula obi o.n 0.80 0 .81 -0.87 -0.45 -0 .44 0.35 
Table IV 
Correlation between Vote (times Turnout) and Turnout for Russia's Choice in Urban, 
Non-Urban Areas and for whole Region. 
Rayons 
Region Urban Non- Overall 
Urban 
Krasnoyarsk Kray 0.32 -0.24 -0.40 
Arcbangelk obi 0.20 0.07 -0.1 5  
Driansk obi -0.32 0.02 -0.41 
Vladimir obi 0.53 -0.12 -0.38 
Vologod obl n/a 0.07 -0. 1 4  
Voroneg obi 0.63 -0.35 -0.64 
Kalinigrad obi 0.44 -0.13 -0.20 
Kemero obl -0.09 -0.49 -0.58 
Kirov obi 0.40 -0.1 7 -0.29 
Kursk obi -0.66 -0.12 -0.64 
Magadan obi n/a 0.01 -0.40 
Murmansk obi -0.08 -0.03 -0.12 
Nignii Novgorod obi 0.44 -0.33 -0.53 
Novgorod obi n/a -0.45 -0.49 
Orenburg obi 0.09 -0.38 -0.60 
Penza obi -0.52 -0.31 -0.61 
P1.'11Ilt obi -0.05 0.09 -0. 1 6  
·Saratov obi 0.56 -0.08 -0.31 
Sachalinsk obi 0.69 0.50 0.52 
Sverdlovsk obi 0.36 -0. 1 5  -0. 1 7  
Smolensk obi n/a -0.29 -0.63 
Tver obl -0.73 -0.61 -0.79 
Tula obi 0.21 -0.63 -0.74 
Table V 
Difference in Turnout and Vote for Russia's Choice in Urban and Non-Urban Areas 
Vote for Russia's Choice Turnout 
Non-Urban Urban Difference Non-Urban Urban Difference 
Krasnoyarsk Kray 8.8 1 7.0 -8.2 59.0 42.0 1 6.0 
Archangel.k obi 16.0 25.0 -8.8 55.0 46.0 8.8 
Driansk obi 9.3 1 7.0 -8.0 64.0 55.0 9 .7 
Vladimir obi 1 3.0 1 9.0 -6.3 59.0 53.0 6.4 
Vologod obi 1 3.0 1 9.0 -6.6 60.0 51 .0 8.8 
Voroneg obl 7.7 1 9.0 -12.0 61 .0 46.0 1 5 .0 
Kalinigrad obi 1 5.0 22.0 -7.0 53.0 5 1 .0 2.2 
Kemero obl 8.3 1 5.0 -6.4 60.0 45.0 1 5.0 
� 
Kirov obi 9.0 1 6.0 -7.3 -S7.0 49.0 8.0 
Kursk obi 6.5 1 7.0 -1 0 .0 68.0 50.0 1 8 .0 
Magadan obi 12.0 1 5 .0 -2.5 50.0 42.0 8.2 
Murmansk obi 1 9.0 25.0 -6.5 50.0 46.0 3.9 
Nignii Novgorod obi 1 0.0 1 7.0 -6.6 53.0 42.0 1 0.0 
Novgorod obi 12.0 1 5 .0 -3.8 57.0 52.0 5.1 
Orenburg obi 7.9 1 8.0 -9.8 61 .0 43.0 1 9.0 
Penza obi 5.7 1 1 .0 -5.8 67.0 53.0 1 5.0 
Pcrmt obi 24.0 32.0 -7.6 42.0 38.0 4 .3 
Saratov obi 7.3 1 7.0 -9 .4 63.0 47.0 1 6.0 
Sachalinsk obi 9.3 1 1 .0 -2.0 48.0 44.0 4.3 
Sverdlovsk obi 1 5.0 27.0 -12.0 49.0 44.0 5.5 
Smolensk obi 7.7 1 5.0 -7.7 67.0 57.0 1 0.0 
Tver obl 1 0.0 1 9.0 -8.9 64.0 51 .0 1 3.0 
Tula obi 1 1 .0 1 8. 0  -6.5 59.0 52.0 7.2 
Number of observations 
Number of regions 
Table VD 
Regions where local 
heads won the elections 
sn 
16 
Regions where All Regions 
local heads either 
were not run or ran 
and lost 
209 
7 
786 
23 
Correlation between the turnout and the turnout times the vote for -
Constituion 
Russia's Choice 
Yabloko 
0.06 
-0.39 
-0.51 
0.03 0.01 
-0.50 -0.48 
-0.40 -0.48 
Table VIII 
Correlation between Turnout and Vote for candidates in Federal Council 
1'st Winner 2'nd Winner third 
Krasnoyarsk Kray -0.33 Head, Kray Administration 0.20 Direaor of chemical company 0.21 
Arcbangelk obi 0.03 Head, Oblut Administration -0.54 Chairman Brick co�arJ -0 .56 
Briansk obi 0.40 Fonner Head, Oblall 0.32 t.lilitary officer -0.29 
Vladimir obi 0.34 llFad. Oblast Adminillntion 0.1 2 Representative of the President -0.27 
Vologod obl -0.61 1 Mayor, Cherepovets City 0.42 Head, Oblast Administration 0.41 
Voroneg obi -0.64 Head, Oblast Adminilllation -0.52 Executive ofOblast Administration 0.74 
Kalinigrad obi -0.34 Dep�y Prime Minister 0.34 Head, Obla!t Administration -0.3 1  
Kemero obl 0.45 Former Chaiman of Soviet -0.27 Deputy chief of local no:\upapc:r 0.01 
Kirov obi 0.06 Head, Oblast Administntion -0. 1 4  Rea or -0.26 
Kursk obl 0.75 Chainnan of Soviet Councli 0.71 l lead, Oblast Administration -0 .43 
Magadan obi -0. 1 5  Joint Stock COl11>1nY dircaor -0.49 Dirc11or of constuction compuny 0.56 
Munnansk obi -0. 1 5  Articservice co�y 0.47 Official ofOblast administration -0.46 
Nigaii Novgorod obi -0.44 Oovcmor -0.04 Chairman of Soviet Councli 0.45 
Novgorod obi 0.66 Head, Oblast Administration -0.22 Director -0.65 
Orenburg obi 0.50 Head, Oblast Administration -0.64 Director 0.66 
Penza obi 0.53 l lead, Oblast Administration -0.54 Head of City Administration 0.02 
Pcrmt obi -0.1 1 director -0.36 president of company 0.44 
Saratov obi 0.60 11.:ad, Oblast Administratico -0.02 first °".f>utY of !lead of City Administration -0.49 
Sacbalinsk obi 0.02 I lead, Oblast Administration 0.03 Director 0.36 
· Sverdlovsk obi -0. 1 9  former Governor 0. 1 4  no official posit ion 0.01 
Smolensk obi 0 .74 l lead, Oblast Administration -0.63 Deputy Minisa.:r 0.70 
Tver obl 0 .62 I lead, Oblast Administration -0 .6 1 Professor 0.57 
Tula obi 0.67 Chairman of collective farm -0.26 Presid.:nt of Company Moscow resident -0.63 
\.. 1 ' J 
